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THE PROBLEM OF IMAGES: A VIEW 
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abstract
Why do humans create images and what are their features that make them special? How are image-
making and the uses of images related? What is the purpose of images? The “problem of images” is 
addressed through the lens of contemporary neuroscience, arguing why and how neuroscience can 
investigate our relationship with art and aesthetics, framing this empirical approach as “experimental 
aesthetics.” Recent discoveries are presented that changed our ideas about perception, action, and 
cognition and the relationship among them, allowing a new look—complementary to the humanistic 
approach—at the problem of images. A new model of perception and cognition is proposed, called 
embodied simulation, which reveals the constitutive relationship between brain-body and the reception 
of human creative expressions.
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The production of images and their reception are specific features of the human species. Why 
do humans produce images? What are the distinctive features making man-made images 
special? What is the relationship between image-making and the use of images, their purpose 
and experience? Is there any privileged perspective to address these issues? These and many 
more questions show how problematic is our relation to images. Indeed, the “problem of 
images” and its inherent related questions have accompanied human beings since they started 
asking themselves what it means to be human. 
In the last two decades neuroscience has sought to address these issues with its empirical 
approach. Many scholars in the humanities have argued that the neuroscientific approach to 
the problem of images, and – more broadly – to art and aesthetics is, on the one hand, unable 
to reveal anything new and, on the other, may even hinder and/or destroy the wonder and 
awe normally accompanying our appreciation of art works. Alva Noë’s most recent book, 
Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature (2016), constitutes a telling example of this negative 
attitude. Noë downplays the heuristic value of neuroscience in general, minimizing or even 
neglecting important results accomplished in a variety of domains. He also argues that 
neuroscience totally misses the point on art inasmuch it fails to answer the relevant questions, 
such as why do works of art move us, or why do we value works of art. It is not the purpose of 
this short essay to offer a detailed reply to Noë’s utterly negative stance. It may suffice here 
to say two things: First, the way Noë portrays neuroscience is, at best, a caricature; second, he 
seems to conflate a variety of approaches and explananda.
Indeed, cognitive neuroscience empirically investigates art and aesthetics using many 
different approaches, to address different issues and questions: a) by using artistic expressions 
to understand how the brain works; b) by localizing in the brain -and/or reducing to its 
functioning- aesthetic concepts (beauty, the sublime, etc.); c) by studying the brain to explain 
art; d) by studying the brain-body in relation to artistic expressions, in order to understand 
the constitutive elements of aesthetic experience and the genesis of aesthetic concepts.
I posit that neuroscience can be highly relevant to address the problem of man-made images 
and aesthetics, particularly if spelled out as in d). In the present article, I suggest – pace 
Noë – why and how neuroscience can investigate our relationship with man-made images, 
framing this empirical approach as “experimental aesthetics.” Experimental aesthetics 
addresses the problem of man-made images by investigating the physiological correlates of 
the aesthetic experience humans make of works of art. I use the notion of aesthetics according 




features of our experience of perceptual objects. Of course, the sensorimotor components 
of aesthetic experience are just one of the many levels at which images can be experienced 
and understood. Experimental aesthetics aims to shed new light on the bodily aspects of our 
reception of images. A further aim is to investigate whether and to which extent even the 
reportedly most ‘detached’ aspects of aesthetic experience, like the explicit evaluation of the 
formal artistic quality of works of art, are related to embodiment.
As argued by John Dewey, “In order to understand the meaning of artistic products, we 
have to forget them for a time, to turn aside from them and have recourse to the ordinary 
forces and conditions of experience that we do not usually regard as aesthetic.” (Dewey, 
1934, 4). The problem of man-made images can be initially framed as a particular case of the 
broader problem of images qua images (Freedberg & Gallese, 2007). From that it follows that 
neuroscience by itself is not sufficient to provide a full account of art and artistic images, as 
they are both strongly culturally and historically determined and situated (Shiner, 2001).
Neuroscience, nevertheless, can shed new light on the bodily components of the complex 
manifold we designate as “aesthetic experience.” By means of neuroscience, used as a sort of 
“cognitive archeology” (Gallese, 1999), we can empirically investigate the neurophysiological 
brain-body mechanisms enabling our interactions with the world, detect possible functional 
antecedents of our cognitive skills, and measure the sociocultural influence exerted by 
human cultural evolution onto the very same cognitive skills. In so doing, we can explain - 
and eventually revise - with a new sub-personal level of description some of the concepts 
we normally use when referring to intersubjectivity, aesthetics, and art, as well as to the 
experience we make of them.
The proposal I am defending here is that the experience of man-made images can be fruitfully 
approached by clarifying its bodily and neurobiological grounding elements. In so doing, we 
might eventually acquire a better understanding of what the concepts we normally use when 
referring to aesthetics and art are made of.
In the following sections, I illustrate how recent discoveries of neuroscience revolutionized 
our ideas about perception, action, and cognition and the relationship among them, allowing 
a fresher look—complementary to the humanistic approach—at the problem of images. 
My purpose is not to reduce aesthetics to the mere working of neurons, but to enrich our 
perspective on distinctive aspects defining our human nature. 
The new model of perception and cognition I propose, embodied simulation, reveals the 
constitutive relationship between body and creative expression and its reception. Embodied 
simulation shows that human experience—broadly speaking—should always be understood 
as a natural form of relational experience. As Siri Hustvedt wrote: “Visual art exists only 
to be seen. It is the silent encounter between the viewer, ‘I’, and the object, ‘it’. That ‘it’, 
however, is the material trace of another human consciousness. [. . .] The painting carries 
within it the residue of an ‘I’ or a ‘you’. In art, the meeting between viewer and thing implies 
intersubjectivity. [. . .] The intersubjectivity inherent in looking at art means that it is a 
personal, not impersonal act” (Hustvedt, 2005, xix).
The first important contribution of neuroscience to the problem of images is a novel notion of 
visual perception. 
Our vision of the world is complex and – most importantly – it exceeds the mere activation 
of the so-called visual part of the brain. Neuroscience has shown that vision is multimodal: it 
encompasses the activation of motor, somatosensory, and emotion-related brain networks. 
Motor neurons not only cause movements and actions but they also respond to body-related 
visual, tactile, and auditory stimuli, mapping the space around us, the objects at hand in that 
very same space, and the actions of others. Cortical motor networks thus provide the bodily-
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formatted motor representational content of space, objects, and actions. 
The space surrounding our body—peripersonal space—whose limits are the working limits 
of our arm, is defined by the motor potentialities of our body. Premotor neurons controlling 
the movements of the upper arm also respond to tactile stimuli applied to it, to visual stimuli 
moved within the arm’s peripersonal space, or to auditory stimuli also originating from the 
same peripersonal space (Fogassi et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1997).
Manipulable objects, when observed, are mapped by the motor brain as potential targets of 
the interactions we might entertain with them. Premotor and parietal “canonical neurons” 
control the grasping and manipulation of objects, but also respond to their mere observation 
(Murata et al., 1997; Raos et al., 2006).
Finally, mirror neurons (Gallese et al., 1996), motor neurons activated during the execution of 
action and its observation when performed by someone else, map the action of others on the 
observers’ motor representation of the same action (for review, see Rizzolatti et al., 2001). 
The human brain is also endowed with a mechanism directly mapping action perception and 
action execution, defined as “Mirror Mechanism” (MM, for further review, see Gallese et al., 
2004; Gallese, 2014a, b; Gallese and Guerra, 2015; Gallese and Cuccio, 2015). In humans too, the 
motor brain is multimodal. The brain circuits displaying the MM connect frontal and posterior 
parietal multimodal motor neurons, most likely analogous to macaques’ mirror neurons. 
These brain circuits map a given motor content like “reach out,” “grasp,” or “hold” not only 
when controlling its performance, but also during its perception when performed by someone 
else, when imitating it, or when imagining performing it, while being perfectly still. In sum, 
the cortical motor system is not just a mere muscles controller, but an integral part of our 
cognitive system, the key element of our ‘motor cognition’ (Gallese et al., 2009). 
When acting or imitating someone else’s action, the corticospinal pathway is activated, 
causing the excitation of muscles and the ensuing movements. When, instead, we observe or 
imagine movements and actions, actual action execution is inhibited. The motor system is 
activated, but not in all of its components and not with the same intensity as when we actively 
move our body: action is not produced but only simulated.
The embodied simulation of action likely provides the conditions allowing for the phenomenal 
quality of the experience of imagined or observed actions. Embodied simulation thus allows 
a direct apprehension of the relational quality linking to our body space, objects, and the 
actions of others. The primordial quality turning space, objects, and behavior into intentional 
objects is their constitution as the objects of the motor intentionality expressed by the motor 
potentialities of our body (Gallese, 2000, 2014a, 2016; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010).
Further research showed that other types of MMs underpin our capacity to directly apprehend 
the emotions and sensations of others because of a shared representational bodily format. 
When perceiving others expressing disgust or experiencing touch or pain, some of the same 
brain areas are activated as when we subjectively experience the same emotion or sensation. 
We do not fully experience their qualitative content, which remains largely opaque to us; 
however, embodied simulation enables us to experience others as experiencing emotions or 
sensations we know from the inside, as it were.
The discovery of mirror neurons gives us a new empirically founded notion of 
intersubjectivity, first and foremost conceived as intercorporeality—the mutual resonance of 
intentionally meaningful sensorimotor behaviors. Our understanding of others as intentional 
agents does not exclusively depend on language, but also on the relational nature of action. In 
many situations, we can directly grasp the meaning of other people’s basic actions thanks to 
the motor equivalence between what others do and what we can do.








Motor simulation instantiated by neurons endowed with the MM is probably the neural 
correlate of this human faculty, describable in functional terms as “embodied simulation” 
(Gallese, 2005, 2014a, 2016; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2011). The variety of MMs present in our brain, 
thanks to the “intentional attunement” they generate, allows us to recognize others as other 
bodily selves, enabling basic forms of intersubjective communication and mutual implicit 
understanding (Gallese, 2014a, 2016).
Embodied simulation provides a unified theoretical framework for all of these phenomena. 
Our social interactions become meaningful by means of reusing our own mental states or 
processes in functionally attributing them to others (for the notion of reuse, see Gallese, 2014a, 
2016). In this context, simulation is conceived of as a nonconscious, pre-reflective functional 
mechanism of the brain–body system whose function is to model objects, agents, and events. 
This mechanism can be triggered during our interactions with others, being plastically 
modulated by contextual, cognitive, and personal identity-related factors.
As we have seen in the previous section, embodied simulation is also triggered during the 
experience of spatiality around our body and during the contemplation of objects. The 
functional architecture of embodied simulation seems to constitute a basic characteristic of 
our brain, making possible our rich and diversified experiences of space, objects, and other 
individuals, being at the basis of our capacity to empathize with them. 
Altogether these results suggest that empathy, or at the very least many of its bodily qualities, 
might be underpinned by embodied simulation mechanisms. Empathy can be conceived of 
as the consequence of our natural tendency to experience interpersonal relations first and 
foremost at the implicit level of intercorporeality.
Embodied simulation not only connects us to others; it connects us to our world, a world 
populated by natural objects, man-made objects, and other individuals, a world in which most 
of the time we feel at home. The sense we attribute to our lived experience of the world is 
grounded on the affective-laden relational quality of our bodily action potentialities, enabled 
by the way they are mapped in our brains.
Experimental aesthetics emphasizes the social performative nature of human creative 
expressions. By addressing human forms of creative expression in terms of social 
performativity, experimental aesthetics can fully exploit the heuristic value of embodied 
simulation.
Indeed, embodied simulation can be relevant to aesthetic experience in at least two ways: 
first, because of the bodily feelings triggered by the works of art we relate to, by means of 
the MMs they evoke. In such a way, embodied simulation generates the peculiar “seeing-
as” characterizing our aesthetic experience of the images we look at. Second, because of the 
potential intimate relationship between the symbol-making gesture and its reception by 
beholders. The embodied simulation of the hand gestures that produced the image enables its 
experience (Freedberg & Gallese, 2007; see also Gallese & Di Dio, 2012; Gallese, 2012, 2014a, b; 
Gallese & Gattara, 2015).
Our scientific investigation of visual arts began with this second aspect. We investigated the 
link between the expressive gestures of the hand and the images those gestures produced in 
three distinct experiments with high-density electroencephalography (EEG). We recorded 
beholders’ brain responses to graphic signs like letters, ideograms, and scribbles, or to abstract 
artwork by Lucio Fontana and Franz Kline.
The results of the first study showed that observing a letter of the Roman alphabet, a Chinese 
ideogram, or a meaningless scribble, all written by hand, activates the beholders’ motor 
representation of their hand (Heimann, Umiltà & Gallese, 2013). In the two other studies, we 
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cuts on canvas by Lucio Fontana (Umiltà et al., 2012), or at the dynamic brushstrokes on canvas 
by Franz Kline (Sbriscia-Fioretti et al., 2013).
The visible traces of the creative gestures activate in the observer the specific motor areas 
controlling the execution of the same gestures. Beholders’ eyes catch not only information 
about the shape, direction, and texture of the cuts or strokes; by means of embodied 
simulation they breach into the actual motor expression of the artist when creating the 
artwork. The sensorimotor component of image perception, together with the jointly evoked 
sensory and emotional reactions, allow beholders to feel the artwork in an embodied manner.
A possible criticism of this model could point out the supposed passivity of its account of 
aesthetic experience, where beholders seem to be relegated to a deterministic empathic 
receptivity, hence losing sight of the peculiar individual quality of aesthetic experience, 
largely determined by one’s individual taste, background, memories, education, and expertise.
A second objection frequently raised against empathic–mimetic accounts of aesthetic 
experience consists of opposing the ambiguity and indeterminacy of art’s symbolic content to 
the supposedly mechanistic quality of empathic responses, hence incapable of capturing the 
potential intrinsic ambiguity and polysemic quality of works of art.
It is possible to challenge these criticisms by arguing that there is ample proof that MMs and 
embodied simulation are dynamically modulated and affected by contingent and idiosyncratic 
factors. Indeed, several studies showed that one’s previous experiences, memories, and 
expertise strongly determine the intensity of activation of MMs and the ensuing perceptual 
contents. (For recent reviews, see Gallese, 2014a, 2016; Ammaniti & Gallese, 2014; Gallese & 
Guerra, 2015.) 
Embodied simulation, by virtue of its diachronic plasticity and modulation, might also be the 
vehicle of the projective qualities of our aesthetic experience, where our personal and social 
identity, the context, our mood and disposition literally shape the way we relate to perceptual 
objects. Embodied simulation, if conceived of as the dynamic instantiation of our implicit 
memories, can relate perceptual objects to beholders with a specific, unique, and historically 
determined quality. I submit that this projective quality of embodied simulation can do justice 
to both objections.
Being human not only means to experience physical reality, but also to conceive possible 
worlds, to surrender to imagination and fictional worlds. An interesting topic for neuroscience 
to investigate is how our brain–body enables us to navigate in real and fictional worlds, 
constantly switching between them. Embodied simulation, a new model of perception and 
cognition, also reveals that the human experience of man-made images—broadly speaking—
should always be understood as a natural form of relational experience. We live in relation to 
other people and objects present in our real world, but we live as well in relation to people and 
objects that are part of imaginary fictional worlds, which in the course of our cultural history 
we came to identify as art. Both kinds of relationships are rooted in our brain–body. The very 
same forms of sociality enabling artistic expressions and their reception are, at their basis, a 
further exemplification of intersubjectivity, conceived of as intercorporeality.
Neuroscience allows us to understand how the line between what we call reality and the 
imaginary and imagined worlds of fiction is much less sharp and clear than one might think. 
Indeed, experiencing an emotion and imagining it are both underpinned by the activation 
of partly identical brain circuits, although differently connected, when engaged in these 
different cognitive and phenomenal situations. Similarly, to see something and to imagine 
it, to act and imagining to act, share the activation of partly common brain circuits. A recent 
high-density EEG study showed that the brain circuits that inhibit action execution are partly 








dual activation patterns of the same brain circuits represent a further expression of embodied 
simulation and neural reuse (Gallese, 2014a, 2016).
A further advantage of embodied simulation consists of the possibility of addressing human 
forms of creative expression in terms of social performativity. Indeed, the biocultural 
approach to art and aesthetics, heavily influenced by cultural anthropology, emphasizes the 
performative character of human creativity. The anthropologist Tim Ingold wrote: “Hunters 
and gatherers of the past were painting and carving, but they were not “producing art.” … 
We must cease thinking of painting and carving as modalities of the production of art, and 
view art instead as one rather peculiar, and historically very specific objectification of the 
activities of painting and carving” (Ingold, 2000, 131). Similarly, Ellen Dissanayake wrote: “Art 
is not an ornamental and dispensable luxury, but intrinsic to our species. … Art as a behavioral 
complex is an inherited tendency to act in a certain way, given appropriate circumstances” 
(Dissanayake, 1992, 224).
However, there is a clear distinction between how we experience the real world and the 
worlds of fiction. Our relationship with fictional worlds is double-edged: on the one hand, we 
pretend them to be true, while, on the other, we are fully aware they are not. 
In spite of the fact that the body is at the core of our perceptions, of our understanding, 
and of our imagination, the relationship with fictional worlds is still mainly explained in 
purely cognitive terms, that is, following Coleridge, in terms of suspension of disbelief. This 
explanation, however, is at best partial. It was proposed that embodied simulation can be 
relevant to our experience of fictional worlds because of the feeling of body they evoke, by 
means of the potentiation of the mirroring mechanisms they activate (Wojciehowski & Gallese, 
2011; see also Gallese, 2011, 2012, 2014b; Gallese & Guerra, 2015). Through this potentiation, 
embodied simulation generates the specific attitude informing our aesthetic experience, 
boosting the bodily memories and imaginative associations fictional content can awake in our 
minds, thus providing the idiosyncratic character of its appreciation.
How is such potentiation achieved? One important context-dependent aspect characterizing 
our relationship to fictional worlds deals with our distancing from the unrelated external 
world, which remains at the periphery of our attentional focus, very much like the frames 
surrounding the images we are beholding. According to my hypothesis, such distancing, this 
temporary suspension of the active grip on our daily occupations, liberates new simulative 
energies. Our experience of fictional worlds, besides being a suspension of disbelief, can thus 
be interpreted as a sort of “liberated embodied simulation.” When adopting such aesthetic 
attitude, our embodied simulation becomes liberated, that is, it is to a large extent freed from 
the burden of modeling our actual presence in daily life (Gallese, 2011, 2012; Wojciehowski 
& Gallese, 2011; Gallese & Guerra, 2015). Through an immersive state, in which our attention 
is focused on the fictional world, we can fully deploy our simulative resources, letting our 
defensive guard against daily reality slip for a while.
Finally, I posit that when engaged with fictional worlds, the contextual bodily framing —
our being still— additionally boosts our embodied simulation. Being still enables us to fully 
deploy our simulative resources at the service of the immersive relationship with the fictional 
world, thus generating a greater feeling of body. Being forced to inaction, we are more open 
to feelings and emotions. The specific and moving experience generated when immersed in 
fictional worlds is thus likely also driven by the sense of safe intimacy with a world we not 
only imagine, but also literally embody.
When we relate to fictional worlds, our attitude towards their content can be characterized 
as a sort of “neotenic look,” somehow similar to the way we are looking at the world during 
that early period of our development in which, because of our poor motor autonomy, our 
interactions with the world are mainly mediated by the embodied simulation of events, 
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actions, and emotions animating our social landscape. During the first months of our extra-
uterine life, while observing others’ behaviors, thanks to embodied simulation and its 
plasticity we learn to calibrate gestures and expressions and to match them with experiences 
of pleasure and displeasure.
When we relate to fictional worlds, as when we contemplate works of art, our relative 
immobility is no longer the consequence of the immaturity of our sensorimotor development, 
but the outcome of our deliberate decision. However, immobility, that is, motor inhibition, 
probably allows us to allocate more neural resources to the service of our beholding, 
intensifying the activation of bodily formatted representations and, in so doing, making us 
adhere more intensely to what we are simulating. Perhaps it is no coincidence that some of the 
most vivid fictional experiences we entertain, as those occurring during dreams, are paralleled 
by the massive inhibition of our muscles.
During the aesthetic experience of fictional worlds, our experience is mediated by the 
simulative perception of the events, actions, and emotions that form the content of fiction. For 
example, when watching a movie or reading a novel, we not only focus our attention on them, 
but our immobility enables us to fully deploy our embodied simulation resources and put them 
at the service of our immersive relationship with the story. This hypothesis can plausibly 
contribute to explaining the difference between our “aesthetic attitude” towards fictional 
worlds and our ordinary consciousness of prosaic reality.
The creative processes characterizing our species, in spite of their progressive abstraction 
and externalization from the body, keep intact their bodily ties. Creative expression, through 
image-making, is tied to the body not only because the body is the image-making instrument, 
but also because the body is the main medium allowing the experience of man-made images. 
Through the lens of neuroscience, we can now look at the human aesthetic–symbolic dimension 
also from the dimension of bodily presence. According to Hans Gumbrecht (2004), aesthetic 
experience involves two components: one deals with meaning, the other with presence. The 
notion of presence entails the bodily involvement of image beholders through a synesthetic 
multimodal relationship with the artistic/cultural artifact, whose perception is qualified by 
Gumbrecht as “haptic vision.” According to Gumbrecht, every culture can be analyzed and 
studied from the double perspective of meaning and presence, because both can be found in 
variable percentages in every cultural object. When presence predominates, world objects 
chiefly acquire their sense by virtue of their intrinsic sensorimotor inherence to perceivers.
The added value experimental aesthetics can bring to the debate in aesthetics consists in 
revitalizing the scientific study of artistic styles, focusing on their biological bodily roots. By 
empirically investigating aesthetic experience, the outcomes of human creative expression 
can be viewed and interpreted in ways less conditioned by the contemporary Western cultural 
and aesthetic canon, because such influences can be specifically studied, thus granting their 
thorough understanding.
Contemporary neuroscience shows that what we see is not the simple “visual” recording 
in our brain of what stands in front of our eyes, but the result of a complex construction, 
whose outcome is the result of the fundamental contribution of our body with its motor 
potentialities, our senses and emotions, our imagination, and our memories. We must 
definitely abandon the outdated concept of solipsistic and “purely visual” vision. Vision is a 
complex experience, intrinsically synesthetic, that is, made of attributes that largely exceed 
the mere transposition in visual coordinates of what we experience any time we lay our eyes 
on something. The expression “laying the eyes” indeed betrays the haptic quality of vision: our 
eyes are not just optical instruments, but are also a “hand” touching and exploring the visible, 




With the aid of neuroscience, we can better test the supposed universality of human artistic 
expression and, most importantly, challenge its allegedly unique logocentric origin. Cognitive 
neuroscience can surrender us from the forced choice between the totalizing relativism of 
social constructivism, which doesn’t leave any room for the constitutive role of the body in 
cognition, and the deterministic scientism of some quarters of evolutionary psychology, which 
aims at explaining art exclusively in terms of adaptation and modularity.
Experimental aesthetics can shed new light -from its own peculiar perspective and 
methodology- on the aesthetic quality of human nature and its natural creative inclination. 
In so doing, it will help us understand why and how creative expression, and what we now 
designate as art, are among the most fundamental expressions of our species.
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